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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did officers possess sufficient probable cause to 
initially stop Mr. Deitman and Mr. Lozano? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
GERALD W. DEITMAN and 
ALBERT D. LOZANO, 
Defendants/Appellants 
Case No. 20584 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment against Gerald W. 
Deitman and Albert Delphine Lozano for one count of burglary, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann §76-6-202 
(1953 as amended) (Addendum A), and one count of theft, a 
second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412 
(Addendum B). The trial judge found both Defendants guilty 
following a trial on February 4, 1985, in the Third District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding. The Defendants were 
both sentenced to incarceration for a term of 0-5 years, but 
the sentences were stayed and both Defendants were placed on 
18-months probation and fined (R. 69,76). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early morning hours of March 1, 1984, officers 
were alerted to a possible burglary at International Video, 40 
East 1300 South in Salt Lake City (T. 37-38). When Salt Lake 
City Police Officers Morgan Sayes and Ken Schoney arrived at 
the scene, they noticed a white pickup truck which was parked 
across the street from International Video. As the officers 
approached the video store, they heard the truck's engine 
start, saw the lights come on and watched the truck proceed 
southbound (T. 38-40,55). Officer Sayes then followed the 
truck to a residence at "1500 something South Edison Street on 
400 East" (T. 41), waited for the occupants to exit the 
vehicle, and then asked the two men for identification (T. 
42). The vehicle's occupants were Mr. Deitman and Mr. Lozano. 
Officer Sayes ran a warrant check and found an outstanding 
warrant for Mr. Lozano. However, he did not arrest Mr. Lozano 
and both men were allowed to leave (T. 52). 
Officer Sayes then returned to International Video and 
for the first time determined that indeed there had been a 
burglary (T. 43,52). A window had been broken and the owner of 
the store told the officers that a two-piece video recorder was 
missing (T. 15,52). Officer Sayes then returned to the 
residence where he had initially stopped Mr. Deitman and Mr. 
Lozano. Officer Sayes joined Officer Cracroft who had been 
watching the residence and had notified Officer Sayes that the 
two men had come back outside (T. 44). Officer Sayes 
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approached the house and as he passed the truck, which was 
parked at the house. He shined his flashlight into the back 
window, went around and checked the side window and then the 
cab window. "Basic officer safety" was officer Sayes' 
explanation for this viewing into the truck (T. 47). The 
officer testified he "saw a corner of something" while looking 
in the truck, but could not identify it (T. 48). However, 
another officer who had arrived at the scene also shined his 
flashlight into the back of the camper and saw more. Officer 
Bruce Smith, who was acquainted with Mr. Deitman, advised him 
that he should let the officers "look in his truck so we could 
get on our way and look for the real burglars" (T. 146). Mr. 
Deitman told the officers they could look, but could not get 
into the truck (T. 147). Officer Smith then observed "a 
rectangular type object, black in color and I could see what 
appeared to be a memory switch" (T. 148). 
Mr. Lozano and Mr. Deitman were then placed under 
arrest (T. 46,57). The truck was seized and taken to the 
impound lot (T. 156). A search warrant was obtained the next 
day, March 2, 1984, and the truck was searched. A two-piece 
video recorder was found in the truck, matching the description 
of the one taken from International Video. However, the owner 
of the store, Mr. Shiotani, failed to give police the second 
serial number on the second piece of equipment and this was not 
in the information on the search warrant or the accompanying 
affidavit (T. 158,159). 
Mr. Deitman and Mr. Lozano were charged with burglary, 
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a third degree felony, and theft, a second degree felony. 
Prior to trial, defense counsel submitted a Motion to 
SuppressEvidence Illegally Seized (T. 58-63) based on the fact 
that State's Exhibit Fifteen (15), the search warrant and 
affidavit, (Addendum C), authorized the seizure of one item, 
namely a two-piece video recorder with one serial number (R. 
62). The actual evidence confiscated consisted of two distinct 
pieces of video equipment, each with its own serial number. 
This motion was denied, but counsel again argued for 
suppression of the evidence at trial, based on these facts and 
the fact that the officers involved did not have probable cause 
to effectuate the initial stop in the case (T. 164-169). 
Mr. Deitman and Mr. Lozano were found guilty as 
charged after a bench trial and were then both sentenced to 0-5 
years incarceration. The sentence was stayed and both 
Defendants were put on probation for 18 months and fined. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellants content that evidence produced against 
them should have been suppressed as a result of an illegal 
investigative detention. Officers had no reason to stop 
Appellants because at the time of the stop, officers did not 
even know if a crime had been committed. 
- 4 -
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ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE USED TO CONVICT THE 
APPELLANTS 
BEEN 
AT TRIAL 
SUPPRESSED AS 
SHOULD 
THERE 
HAVE 
WAS NOT 
SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
EFFECTUATE A STOP. 
The trial court in this case found the Defendants, 
Gerald W. Deitman and Albert Delphine Lozano, guilty of third 
degree burglary and second degree theft. At trial Defendants' 
counsel objected to the introduction of a two-piece video 
recorder (Exhibits No. 5 and 6), claiming the search warrant 
and affidavit for the warrant did not contain the same serial 
numbers as those found on the confiscated video recorder. In 
fact, the search warrant contained only one serial number 
rather than the two found on the video recorder. This was a 
renewal of Defendants' earlier pre-trial Motion to Suppress (T. 
58-63). Defendants' counsel also argued at trial that the 
evidence was illegally obtained and should therefore have been 
suppressed because officers did not have sufficient probable 
cause to initially stop the Defendants (T. 5,164). Appellants 
now rely on that ground in bringing this appeal. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 states that: 
"A peace officer may stop any 
person in a public place when he 
has a reasonable suspicion to believe 
he has committed or is in the act of 
- 5 -
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committing or is attempting to commit 
a public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions." 
(Emphasis added). 
In determining what constitutes a "reasonable suspicion" the 
United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,51 
(1979) required such suspicion to be "based on objective facts, 
that the individual is involved in criminal activity." In that 
case, the Court found that an individual's presence in the 
alley of a neighborhood frequented by drug users was not 
sufficient in and of itself, without suspicion of any specific 
misconduct, to amount to an objective fact upon which a stop 
could be justified. The Court went on to say that when the 
stop is not based on objective criteria, "the risk of arbitrary 
and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits." Id. at 
52. --—• -^  . 
In further defining the limits of objective criteria 
resulting in a "reasonable suspicion", this Court has ruled 
that a "mere hunch" will not give rise to the "constitutionally 
mandated 'reasonable suspicion'". State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 
718, 719 (1985). Neither will this Court find 
"reasonablesuspicion" where "the stop was based merely on the 
fact that a car with out-of-state license plates was moving 
slowly through a neighborhood late at night." State v. 
Carpena, 27 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 30 (1986). 
The instant case is similar to Swanigan and Carpena. 
Officer Morgan Sayes testified at trial that in the early 
morning hours of March 1, 1984, approximately 2:30 or 3:00 
a.m., he and Officer Schoney responded to a burglar alarm at 40 
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East 1300 South (T. 37,38). Upon arriving at the scene, 
International Video, the officers got out of their car and 
began walking toward the building from which the alarm came (T. 
38). Before reaching the building, however, Officer Sayes saw 
a pickup truck with a camper parked on the opposite side of the 
street "about twenty-five yards down the street" (T. 39). The 
truck's lights came on, the engine was started, and the truck 
proceeded southbound down the street (T. 40). 
Officer Sayes further testified that although few cars 
were parked on the street at that time, the pickup truck was 
not the only parked car (T. 50). The pickup truck was also 
parked approximately one-half block away from an all-night 
restaurant and near an apartment complex (T. 61-62). Officer 
Sayes admitted on cross-examination that in responding to the 
alarm, he did not know whether or not it was false (T. 53). 
The following exchange occurred: 
Q: (By Ms. Wells) Did you merely 
receive a call from your dispatcher 
that an alarm had gone off in the 
area? 
A. We received a burglary alarm 
at that address and basically we 
responded to that, not knowing 
whether it would be a good alarm 
or false alarm or whatever (T. 53). 
In fact, Officers Sayes did not know whether the alarm was 
false or real until sometime later (T. 51). 
In State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (1985), two 
individuals were stopped in an area "where recent burglaries 
had been reported" and where police knew a very recent burglary 
had been committed. The two people stopped had been noticed by 
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an officer shortly after the burglary had been reported. 
However, they were not stopped until spotted once again two 
hours later. The two were stopped based on the earlier general < 
description given by the first officer to notice them. The 
Utah Supreme Court found that "neither officer had any 
knowledge that defendant and his companion had been at the 
scene of the crime" and that they "had not observed the men 
engaged in any unlawful or suspicious activity." Likewise, in 
the instant case, the officers did not observe the Defendants 
engage in any "unlawful or suspicious activity." Further, the 
officers had no knowledge that the Defendants had been at the 
scene of the crime, or even that a crime had initially been 
committed. In Swanigan, supra, the officers knew a burglary 
had been committed before they made a stop. In this case, the 
officer did not determine that any crime had been committed 
until after the Defendants had been initially stopped and the 
officer had returned to International Video. 
After making a warrant check in Swanigan, 
officersarrested Mr. Swanigan and his companion based on an 
outstanding warrant. In this case, Officer Sayes also ran a 
warrant check and found an outstanding warrant on Mr. Lozano 
(T. 52). Nonetheless, the officer released the two Defendants 
after the initial stop and did not arrest them until after 
returning to International Video and ascertaining that a 
burglary had occurred. Equipped with only this additional 
information, Officer Sayes returned to the Defendants1 
residence, shined his flashlight into the pickup truck and saw 
- 8 -
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a "corner of something", not specifically identifiable as a 
video recorder (T. 47). Another officer also used his 
flashlight to look into the truck. He saw a black rectangular 
object and what looked like a memory switch (T. 148). Mr. 
Lozano and Mr. Deitman were then arrested (T. 49,60). 
In State v. Carpena, 27 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 30 (1986), 
the Defendants were in an area at 3:00 a.m. where a "rash of 
burglaries" had occurred, although no burglaries had been 
reported on the night in question. Officers involved "did not 
observe any criminal or traffic offense," but nevertheless 
followed the Defendants1 car to a residence and effectuated a 
stop and search. This Court again found "the officer had no 
objective facts on which to base a reasonable suspicion that 
the men were involved in criminal activity." 
In this case, Mr. Deitman and Mr. Lozano were stopped 
merely because they were parked across the street from a 
possible burglary and happened to start their pickup truck and 
drive away after the police arrived on the scene. The 
Appellants committed no traffic violations, nor were theyseen 
to commit any other criminal activity by the investigating 
officers. In fact, other cars were parked on the street at the 
time and the Appellants' truck was parked only a half a block 
away from an all-night restaurant, and very near to an 
apartment complex. Therefore, the officers possessed no 
objective criteria on which to base a "reasonable suspicion" 
that these two men were in any way involved in the possible 
burglary. The U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v.Texas, supra, 
- 9 -
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supported the need for police to base investigative stops on 
objective criteria "to assure that an individual's reasonable 
expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions < 
solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field." 
Id. at 51. 
Aside from the illegal stop, Appellants were also 
harmed in that the search warrant obtained did not contain the 
two serial numbers found on the items confiscated. The search 
warrant had only one serial number, and this one contained a 
misplaced letter. Although this alone would probably not 
render the property "inherently unidentifiable as being 
stolen", State v. Gallegos, 23 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25 (1985), it 
nonetheless served to prejudice the Appellants' rights even 
further in a situation that should never have been instigated 
in the first place. 
The Appellants respectfully request this Court to set 
aside their conviction because evidence was obtained only as a 
result of an initial illegal investigative stop and evidence 
flowing from that stop should have been suppressed. Wong Sun 
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
- 10 -
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CONCLUSION 
Because the initial stop of Appellants was an illegal 
investigative detention, the evidence flowing from that stop 
should have been suppressed. Appellants now request this Court 
to reverse their convictions and remand the case for either a 
new trial or dismissal of the charges. 
Respectfully submitted this 7*&\3ay of March, 1986. 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, BROOKE C. WELLS, herby certify that four copies of 
the foregoing Appellantfs Brief will be delivered to the 
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this /^ -^flay, djf March, 1986. 
5ROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Appellants 
DELIVERED by 
March, 1986. 
this day of 
- 11 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM A 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
76-6-202. Burglary.—(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters 
or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with 
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed 
in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
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ADDENDUM B 
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76-6-412. Theft—Classification of offenses—Action for treble damages 
against receiver of stolen property.—(1) Theft of property and services 
as provided in this chapter shall be punishable as follows: 
(a) As a felony of the second degree if: * 
(i) The value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; or 
(ii) The property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; or 
(iii) The actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; 
or 
(iv) The property is stolen from the person of another. 
(b) As a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) The value of the property or services is more than $250 but not 
more than $1,000; or 
(ii) The actor has been twice before convicted of theft of property or 
services valued at $250 or less; or 
(iii) When the property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, 
heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry. 
(c) As a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
more than $100 but does not exceed $250. * 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUll C 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
NOe QlbL 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah. 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by 
Bruoe L. Smith - SLCPD * I a m satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
That ( ) on the person (s) of 
( jj in the vehicle (s) described as 1965 Ford Pick-Up, F-10, white in 
QQlor, Utah License #Ifl5Q94 
( ) on the premises known as 
In the City of Salt Lake , County of Salt Lake 
State of Utah, there is now being possessed or concealed certain property or 
evidence described as: 
A 2-piece BCA VCR Model VGP 170, serial #202510058 
which property or evidence: 
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed. 
( ) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense. 
( ) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of 
committing or concealing a public offense, 
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, 
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
( ) is evidence of illegal conduct in possession of a person or 
entity not a party to the illegal conduct and good cause being 
shown that the seizure cannot be obtained by subpoena without 
the evidence being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered. 
(Conditions for service of this warrant are included or attached 
hereto.) 
You are therefore commanded: 
(x) in the day time 
( ) at any time day or night (good cause having been shown) 
( ) to execute without notice of authority or purpose, (proof 
under oath being shown that the object of this search may 
be quickly destroyed or disposed of or that harm may result 
to any person if notice were given) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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PAGE TWO 
SEARCH WARBANT 
to make a search of the above-named or described person(s), vehicle(s), and 
premises for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find 
the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the 
Fifth Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake/'staVe of Utah, or retain such pro-
perty in your custody, subject to the o^ler of J^ his court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this 
COURT 
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IN THE COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RETURN TO SEARCH WARRANT 
NO. MlA 
The personal property (listed below/set out on the invent 
hereto) was taken from the premises located and described as 
and from t Ascribed as LS fUd f/ f,7) 
(,/JiT-^ t-'Q />/;,cz>f*/ 
and from the person (s) of ,M^~ 
by virtue of a search warrant dated the <y day of /LJ [jJ^Lv^ , 19 Q H , 
and executed by Judge 
of the above-entitled court: 
RSW - Page 1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I , JHUJ xd-njUjC by whom this warrant 
was executed, do swear that the (above/attached) inventory contains a true and 
detailed account of all the property taken by me under the warrant, on 
2=_ 19 <?. ¥: 
MdAlL 
All of the property taken by virtue of said warrant will be retained 
in my custody subject to the order of this court of or any other court in 
which the offense in respect to which the property or things taken, is triable. 
$AJUU/^/dm~L<f 
Subscribed and sworn to before me 
tly^ ^ day/If ^ i n 1 19 
>2-
_„• 05 l/M-
ie^Tt possH-oosg 
f_t* UH&TV^ 
RSW - Page 2 
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